The 33-page document shared with Iran International by the hacktivist group Edalat-e Ali (Justice of Ali) is marked “top secret” and named. Guidelines for Identifying, Monitoring, and Using Standards.
This document is linked to the Special Intelligence Documentation Center and Deputy Operations of the IRGC missile command.
Missile operation plan
What emerges from this order is a strategic plan for the deployment of missiles that goes beyond rigid silos or underground “missile cities.”
The article presents elements of starting conditions, analysis methods, coding systems, location records, chains of responsibility and rules for maintaining access to multiple networks that can be used before, during and after missile fire.
Its importance lies not only in the variety of starting conditions it describes, but in the clear inclusion of non-military areas in the system.
In its introduction, the document says that missile sites are an inseparable part of missile warfare tactics and that the increasing ability of the enemy to detect, track and destroy missile systems requires special rules for identifying, selecting, using and maintaining such positions.
It adds that the use of “deception,” “cover” and “normalization” as well as other methods would make the force more effective in using those conditions.
That speech is important. It suggests that the document is not only about protecting fixed military assets. It’s about making missile components harder to distinguish from their surroundings and harder to detect.
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The Iranian military uses schools and public spaces during the US-Israel conflict
Civilian areas as cover for missiles
What the directive means is that it defines how to activate missiles in civilian areas.
Instead of relying only on conventional military structures, the document provides a model in which missile units can move across a wide area of pre-selected areas chosen for hiding, access and operation.
The result is a design that appears to be designed to maintain launch capability while reducing visibility and making detection more difficult.
A clear indication comes in the section on what the document describes as artificial declarations or covert conditions. These include service, industrial and sports facilities, as well as sheds and storage areas – places that are not public in function or appearance, but can be converted to hide missile components.
Conditions listed for such areas include being fenced off, not overlooked by nearby buildings, and requiring CCTV cameras or allowing them to be switched off.
Taken together, those requirements point to a deliberate process of screening public spaces that can be used as cover for missiles. The concern is not only defense against attack, but invisibility within the civilian environment.
The broad nature of the document confirms that conclusion. It has features on spatial identification, names and codes, route and condition analysis, record keeping and accountability across intelligence, operations, engineering, communications, safety, health and efficiency.
This is the language of a standing system, not a developed wartime system.
How to hide
Farzin Nadimi, a senior security and defense analyst at the Washington Institute who reviewed the document for The Lead and Niusha Saremi of Iran International, said the article points to a database-driven effort to identify areas around missile bases that can be used in different scenarios.
He said that the missile force of the IRGC seems to have mapped not only the launch positions, but also the distribution, deception and technical conditions – the last place is the suitable places to store the launchers and support vehicles, and if necessary, to prepare the missiles for firing.
“These technical conditions,” said Nadimi, “can include large, covered areas such as industrial buildings or theaters, where guns and missile support vehicles can be installed, and where missiles can be mounted on guns, weapons, and in the case of water generators, fuel operations are carried out.”
That is important. If buildings that appear to be public or civilian are not only used to protect the radiation, but also to prepare it for launch, then the document explains more than hiding. It describes the integration of missile functions into public services.
A network built for disruption
Nadimi also said that the order emphasizes several times the speed – to enter the vehicles entering these buildings quickly before they start and to return them to cover quickly after that.
In his reading, the database linked to these areas includes technical aspects of each area, access roads and nearby services, including the nearest medical center, police station and military post.
Also, he added, it reports whether the use of the property can be coordinated in advance with the owner, including contact details, or whether the work can take place without prior cooperation in urgent cases.
If so, that would suggest that the system expands to the level of access to assets and the environment of the local population, turning seemingly ordinary areas into pre-planned nodes in the missile network.
The document’s own emphasis on route analysis, site reports, records and code groups supports the picture of a missile force operating with dispersed support structures rather than using only fixed bases.
Why does this put citizens at risk
Nadimi warned that the use of the civilian environment is of particular concern because many of the IRGC’s launchers are themselves designed to meet civilian traffic.
“A lot of these guns are like civilian vehicles or trailers,” he said.
He also said that the larger Khorramshahr artillery can be covered with a white bag that makes them look like a normal white civilian trailer, while the towing vehicle is usually white.
He said, small launchers are usually not painted in the usual way, but in ways that make them invisible in public places.
That idea fits well with the document’s printing on the cover, hiding and disappearing after production. The combination of camouflaged vehicles and pre-defined civilian areas suggests a course of action built around the integration of missile components in a non-military environment.
According to Nadimi, this has direct consequences under the laws of war.
He said: “The use of public places, buildings and structures for this purpose is illegal under the laws of war.” “It removes the protection that those buildings would have, and turns them into legitimate military targets.”
He added that the danger is that citizens who live or work in such areas may not know that an explosive device has been hidden near them until they themselves are attacked.
Formal education, not the exception
Therefore, the leaked directive seems to document something broader than the presence of missile facilities or scattered launch sites.
It points to a systematic approach to expanding missile operations into civilian space – using industrial buildings, service facilities, sports facilities, storage facilities and other non-military areas as part of a launch plan designed to survive surveillance, avoid detection and maintain the ability to fire under wartime pressure.
In that way, this document is not only about missile launch sites. It is about how the military can operate in the everyday sphere of society – and in doing so, transfer the dangers of missile warfare to places and people that outside the country have nothing to do with it.
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